The Communication of Professional Values by Mathews, Robert E.
THE COMMUNICATION OF PROFESSIONAL
VALUES
ROBERT E. MATHEWS *
In their Dialogues, MacLeish says that "it's very rarely that a
man is really shaped or given new direction by a given individual" 1
and van Doren quotes Socrates to the effect that "nobody could
learn anything or did learn anything except what he already knew,
but he didn't know he knew it." 2 Twenty years ago Jacques Barzun
asserted that "the only way to instill any human virtue is to
have parents and teachers and friends who are themselves tolerant
and just, and who in all reasonable opportunities evince that
character." a
Emanating from such sources, views like these might well gen-
erate only frustration and discouragement. For in the field of ethics
it is "new direction" we hope to give; a learning of something not
hitherto known, even subconsciously; it is a human virtue that,
even during some sixteen years of pre-professional education, has
not been adequately instilled by the example of parents, friends and
teachers.
Can it really be that these writers believe that pedagogically
speaking it is impossible to communicate a perception of values?
Or at least that no value not previously perceived, whether know-
ingly or unknowingly, can be communicated? But doesn't this beg
the question? Children will have been told, for instance, of the
values of truth and integrity. Obviously, no one will have reached
law school without having learned of these, without having heard
that they have usefulness, are considered significant in the conduct
of human affairs. In this sense a course in the Legal Profession
or Legal Ethics might be said to introduce no new value. Yet
clearly, these values are now revealed in a new environment,
the environment of professional conduct-conduct in relation to
the client and the client's property, conduct toward the court re-
garding suppression or falsification of evidence or of applicable law.
In childhood there are conflicts between loyalty to parent
or teacher, as contrasted with loyalty to brother or comrade or
* Professor Emeritus, The Ohio State University College of Law; Visiting
Professor, Harvard Law School, 1963-64, and University of Texas, 1965.
1 MacLeish & van Doren, Dialogues 278 (1964).
2 Id. at 98.
3 Barzun, Teacher in America 33 (1945). Barzun does not suggest how these
tolerant exemplars themselves became tolerant.
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members of the same club or gang. A value judgment has to be
made between these loyalties; they must somehow be resolved at
an early age. Yet they reappear dramatically in the new environ-
ment of conflicts betveen the interests of lawyer and client, or the
client and the court, or the government or the public interest.
One need hardly run the gamut of McDougal's inventory of
values to hazard the conjecture that each will have been experi-
enced by every law student at a period long antedating even his
first ambition to become a lawyer. This would seem to make a case
for the remark attributed to Socrates, but it is still a far cry to
contend that "it's very rarely that a person is really shaped or
given new direction by a given individual." If a perception of values,
however latent, has in fact been attained there yet remains a vast
opportunity for its clarification and application to the new rela-
tionships that come with professional life. Even Barzun allows for
this, albeit he confines what he calls the instillation of values to
a single means: that of example.'
But it is obvious indeed that the "noble exemplar method"
has fallen far short of the goals we must set for ourselves in legal
education. This is only too clear from a daily reading of the news-
papers, where the misdoings of our law-trained graduates are re-
corded often enough to dispel any sense of smugness as to how
persuasive the examples of their noble law teachers have already
been. Records of discipline committees and courts-far too few,
one suspects, for the amount of misconduct that actually goes on-
confirm this," and while public opinion polls are far less dependable
as to the conduct of lawyers than as to the voting probabilities of
the electorate, they reveal, nevertheless, a disconcertingly wide-
spread state of ill-repute of the practicing bar. We have long ago
4 For an interesting illustration of the early application of this to legal educa-
tion see Samad, "The Pervasive Approach to Teaching Professional Responsibility,"
26 Ohio St. L.J. 100 (1965).
5 Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own (1962), a survey of individual and small firm
practitioners in Chicago. The same author's later study, not yet published, is based
on interviews with some 800 lawyers in lower Manhattan together with an examina-
tion of records of courts and discipline committees of the bar. He finds that about
1,500 complaints are filed against lawyers each year, only nineteen of which ever
reach the courts--of these ten result in disbarment. Carlin, 'Ethics and the Legal
Profession-A Study of Social Control in the Metropolitan Bar," 1963 (Manuscript
in Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University).
6 See "Lay Opinions of Iowa Lawyers, Courts and Laws," Committee on Public
Relations, Iowa State Bar (1949), summarized in Blaustein, "Vrhat Do Laymen
Think of Lawyers?" 38 A.B.A.J. 39 (1952). The most extensive of these surveys is
doubtless the Missouri Bar Prentice-Hall Survey, in the making of which 2,500 lay-
men and the same number of lawyers were interviewed. This has been commented on
extensively by leaders of the American Bar.
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rejected, by force of incontrovertible fact, any assurance we may
once have had that the professional activities and high character
of the teaching profession (and that, at least, is an assumption we
still adhere to with justifiable confidence) have proved adequate
for education in ethics and responsibility.
If it be assumed that a way can be found for clarifying the
application of ethical values to the professional environment and
that professorial examples have fallen far short of providing this
way, one is faced with at least three questions: what are the various
techniques that are open to us; what is the subject matter to which
we should apply ourselves; and what type of teaching materials
are most conducive to greater success than we have had in the past?
The pedagogical techniques have long ago been discussed.7
More recently, at the New York conference of British, Canadian,
and American law teachers, they were so fully summarized" that
little more is needed here than a brief inventory by way of refresher.
What has been called the "noble exemplar" theory seems still the
exclusive approach (if it can be called an approach at all) in
England, and in many Canadian and a minority of American law
schools. One need not be a cynic to suggest that too often this
is but a cloak for indifference, inertia, or frustration. Unhappily,
the claim that ethical considerations are being adequately intro-
duced into non-ethics courses is too often another cloak of the
same color. This is certainly a justifiable inference to be drawn
from a study made some years ago by a committee of the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools. In reply to inquiries, the deans
of forty-five law schools stated that at least one member of their
faculties was engaged in this practice. It would seem, however, that
the deans must have thought of several such gentlemen, for a total
of 112 names were submitted. Each of these was written to and
the replies revealed only twenty-six who were of the belief that they
were actually doing this.'
7 See Stone, Legal Education and Public Responsibility, a Report and Analysis
of the Conference on the Education of Lawyers for Their Public Responsibilities,
1956 (1959) (Boulder Conference).
8 Mathews, "The Public Responsibilities of the Academic Law Teacher," 14 1.
Legal Ed. 97 (1961), wherein are enumerated certain other approaches not treated
in this paper: (a) the non-ethics course structured for the added purpose of intro-
ducing discussion of ethical consideration, (b) joint lawyer-student discussion groups,
and (c) the use of Legal Aid Clinics for this purpose. Certain of these are also dealt
with in Mathews, "Education for Professional Responsibility," 21 La. L. Rev. 140
(1960).
0 A.A.L.S., Program and Committee Reports 93 (1958); A.A.L.S., Program
and Committee Reports 62 (1959). It is fair to question how many of the twenty-
six were making this effort in any sort of systematic fashion. Even so, out of 108
law schools in the Association at that time with perhaps 2000 faculty members this
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More recently there has emerged a much more promising
trend. It was at the Boulder Conference in 1956 that, so far as is
known, the phrase "pervasive approach" was first used. It was
introduced by the late Edwin E. Aubrey, a non-lawyer theologian. 10
The term is now used for a systematic and planned introduction
of relevant ethical considerations into a course devoted primarily
to other subject matter." The most encouraging impetus to experi-
mentation in this approach has been provided by the National
Council on Legal Clinics, a joint project of the American Bar Asso-
ciation and the Association of American Law Schools. To date the
Council has published two booklets devoted to the use of the perva-
sive approach in each of two fields: the administration of criminal
justice 12 and family law.'" These are excellent examples of the
systematic planning of the introduction of ethical considerations
into non-ethics courses.14 Undoubtedly, as an approach to this
major pedagogical problem of communication of a grasp of ethical
values, this is one of the two most promising. 15 It has, in fact, given
new vitality and quality to the traditional case-method of teaching.
The more traditional mode of dealing with ethics and responsi-
bility has been by a separate course primarily directed to the pur-
pose, sometimes referred to as a "concentrated" course, involving
was indeed a small group of devotees to the cause of education in ethics. A more recent
study, Lamborn, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibilities (1963), concludes that
"about four-fifths of the approved law schools indicate a use in some degree of
the pervasive method. . . . The planned use of the pervasive method with special
materials prepared for the purpose has been found in less than a dozen schools and
in only a limited number of courses." Id. at 7-8.
10 Professor Aubrey was Chairman of the Department of Religious Thought
at the University of Pennsylvania. For his use of this term and the discussion it
prompted, see Stone, op. cit. supra note 7, at 245, 385. Dean Samad recognizes this
in quoting from the Introduction to Professor Stone's account. See Samad, supra
note 4, at 104.
11 An early attempt to outline such an approach was made by the present author,
using the subject matter of Agency and Partnership law as the vehicle course. See
Stone, op. cit. supra note 7, at 387. That the approach be planned and systematic,
rather than spontaneous and sporadic is essential. See Mathews, "Education for Pro-
fessional Responsibility," 21 La. L. Rev. 140, 147 (1960).
12 Schwartz, Cases on Professional Responsibility and the Administration of
Criminal Justice (1961).
'3 In particular, see Levy, Selected Materials on Family Law: Custody, The
Unwed Mother, Adoption, Parental Neglect (1964).
14 For summation of the fifteen projects sponsored by the National Council,
see National Council on Legal Clinics, Preliminary Reports on Seven Experimental
Projects (1962) and Lamborn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 11-13.
15 This has been well discussed by Samad, supra note 4, in the present issue of
this Journal. Also, Lamborn has presented a most comprehensive over-all picture,




"direct teaching." 18 In his recent survey of methods of instruction
in American law schools, Lamborn has pointed out that about
seventy-seven per cent of the law schools responding (ninety-five
schools) offer such courses.17 He states that by far the greatest
proportion are using one of the three casebooks presently avail-
able."" Excellent as these are, they raise the serious question of
whether a casebook approach is suitable for this "concentrated
course." This author has used each of these three works in class and
after due consideration has arrived at a negative conclusion.
The case method was devised for the communication of dialec-
tical skills. Despite the lately accepted tendency to qualify this
method by textual material and problems, it remains even today
the unquestioned sovereign of the freshman year, and the pre-
dominant leader in the second and third. However, as a device to
communicate or clarify values it has, until development of the
pervasive approach, proved a disappointment. Some have even
said it has only served to impede this function. 9 Of necessity, the
opinions used are largely of appellate tribunals, and the number
of lawyer discipline cases that reach this point in the judicial
hierarchy is very small indeed. By all odds the huge majority are
dealt with by local bar association committees with occasional con-
firmation by state committees and state supreme courts (as in
Ohio) or by trial courts. This inevitably means that judicial ac-
counts of most of the incidents involving complaints about lawyer
conduct simply cannot be found for class discussion, and those that
are available are confined to the more extreme form of misconduct,
what might be called the "peripheral pathology." 20
If these considerations are persuasive, one is of course driven
to provide a practical alternative and that, I suggest, is readily
16 Stone, op. cit. supra note 7, at 242, 252-59.
17 Lamborn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 3.
18 A fourth, compiled by Vern Countryman of Harvard, now in temporary
mimeographed form, will be published shortly.
19 See Lon Fuller's comment as reported in Stone, op. cit. supra note 7, at 82.
Also, in his Epilogue, Professor Stone introduces this same query but both are speak-
ing in particular relation to the introduction into the curriculum of an increasing
number of specialized courses. Id. at 323. Patterson, "The Case Method in American
Legal Education: Its Origins and Objectives," 4 J. Legal Ed. 1 (1951), contains
no reference to the communication of ethical values among his ten Merits of the
Case Method, but within the tenth Demerit he lists its inability to touch certain
problems, the illustrations of which all fall within what has come to be called "public
responsibility." See also Morgan, "The Case Method," 4 J. Legal Ed. 379 (1952), a
report prepared for the Survey of the Legal Profession; the report contains no refer-
ence to the matter in question.
20 The writer has long since expressed his concern on this score. See Mathews,
supra note 11, at 148.
1965]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
at hand. It is the preparation of a collection of factual situations
wherein lawyers are presented as having faced, or as about to face,
issues of personal or professional conduct. Immediately this permits
introduction into class discussion of an immense number of issues
now necessarily excluded by the limitations inherent in the case
method. All the borderline questions involved in the building of
a law practice, preparation for and participation in trial work, and
the subtleties and ambiguities of possible conflicts in interest, as
well as the countless aspects of responsible counseling,21 can be set
forth in narrative episodes quite regardless of the unavailability of
written accounts or primary sources. If, too, as is now so generally
accepted, one wishes to discuss the affirmative responsibility of
lawyers to participate in leadership and educational programs in
their communities and nation, almost the only way to do this is by
means of problems raising questions as to the duty to take advan-
tage of opportunities of this sort.2
Moreover, there are those who have found that student atti-
tudes toward the subject matter of a "concentrated course" in
ethics, especially if the course is required rather than elective, intro-
duce impediments not found elsewhere in the curriculum. Often
there is indifference, occasionally even hostility, and quite gener-
ally a wide-spread skepticism as to whether a teacher, long removed
from practice and presently untrammelled by conflicts between
21 An illustration of how effectively the art of counseling can be presented to
law students can be seen in a quite remarkable book, Freemen, Legal Interviewing
and Counseling (1964). After seventy-nine pages of textual material on interviewing
and counseling the remainder of the volume is given over to a series of narrative
episodes about half of which are followed by comments by a portion of the fourteen
contributors, all law-trained but all trained also in such related fields as religion,
sociology, psychology and psychiatry. For an excellent discussion of the function of
the lawyer as counselor in matrimonial affairs, see Pike, Beyond the Law 44 (1963).
22 An important aspect of such responsibility has been tellingly developed by
Professor Jerre Williams in a statement published in the Appendix to Stone, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 394-98. He there advocates that "lawyers be trained as effective
policymakers in resolving significant public controversy" He makes a strong plea that
teachers try to work out ways to sensitize students to controversial public issues; to
develop "the ability to accomplish objectives and responsible resolution of the com-
peting political, social and economic factors that go into such a policy decision." This
emphasis was later brought out in the statement of the Joint Conference on Profes-
sional Responsibility, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1217 (1958), and in the late Arthur T.
Vanderbilt's address at Seton Hall, Report of the Conference on Professional Respon-
sibility, 26-27 (1956).
Another approach is by means of assigned readings in history and biography
wherein law-trained persons are shown to have made contributions of this sort.
Lamborn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 9, includes a reference to this. While undeniably
a useful teaching device, it is essentially supplemental and scarcely lends itself to
the give and take of class-room discussion.
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the interests of clients and his own idealism, can deal realistically
with the alternatives of conduct faced by practitioners. 3 While too
often these obstacles are never adequately overcome, it remains
nevertheless true that a collection of factual situations, far more
than court decisions and bar opinions, catches student interest and
imagination to such an extent as to off-set in large part these diffi-
culties. In sum, I suggest that a collection of problems relating to
the conduct of lawyers will provide a more effective vehicle for
teaching purposes than any of the materials now available for
courses directed primarily to ethics and public responsibility.
The subject matter for a course in the Legal Profession has
already been so well outlined by Professor Countryman elsewhere
in this Journal 24 that there is little to be gained by restating or
summarizing it here. Perhaps, however, it may be relevant to add
that it was less than twelve years ago that most of those relatively
few teachers and practitioners who were concerned with this mat-
ter at all were of the opinion that the subject matter should be
restricted to the conventional areas of the attorney's duty to client,
court, fellow attorney, and such of the public as might be affected
adversely by the performance or rejection of these duties. This area
was then known as "Legal Ethics" and had always been regarded as
comprising all that might be properly included within a law curricu-
lum. It has long been my own view, however, that to restrict our
concern so narrowly was to exclude the far broader field of commu-
nity responsibility 2 that Professor Countryman has summarized.
While there is no need here to restate the boundaries of this area,
there are two comments that are important to make.
The first of these relates to the boundaries themselves. There is
one component of public responsibility, not mentioned elsewhere
which, in my opinion, should clearly be added. This is the educa-
tion of lawyers in an understanding of the personal values that our
23 For instance, see Mathews, "Public Responsibilities of the Academic Law
Teacher," 14 J. Legal Ed. 97, 99 (1961).
24 Countryman, "The Scope of the Lawyer's Professional Responsibility," 26
Ohio St. L.J. 66 (1965). An even more comprehensive survey was provided by
Professor Countryman and Professor David R. Herwitz for the Second Arden House
Conference: "Implementation of Education for Professional Responsibility" (1963)
(unpublished). See also Lamborn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 3, where the distinction
between "legal ethics" and "professional responsibility" is well drawn.
25 Mathews, "Legal Education and Responsible Leadership," 4 J. Legal Ed. 249
(1952). The program there proposed was later endorsed by the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools, the Council of the Section of Legal Education of the American
Bar Association and an impressive list of individual sponsors. See "Activities of the
Association," 5 J. Legal Ed. 217 (1952). The program was submitted to five founda-
tions but it proved impossible to obtain a grant to the Association at that time.
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structure of government is intended to serve, and in his responsi-
bility, as one so educated, to protect and strengthen those values
and to make them living forces. To be sure, part of this is implicit
under a heading such as "Public Leadership," but this particular
opportunity and responsibility of the lawyer should be specifically
directed to the purpose and nature of our sort of democracy and
its institutions-to what MacLeish has elsewhere called the "Ameri-
can Proposition." 26 Basically, this means respect for personality,
one's own as well as that of others. This, after all, is the one funda-
mental value upon which all other values rest. If understood and
genuinely accepted by students and lawyers, it can provide the
motivation for all else, for the fields both of legal ethics and
public responsibility, including community leadership, as well as
a devotion to making the democratic process effective in countless
ways of personal participation and education of the citizenry in the
issues, policies and values at stake. 7 It has been repeated to the
point of tedium that whatever the law schools do or omit to do, our
graduates will appear in public office and positions of leadership
far more frequently than the members of any other profession.
It necessarily follows that it is the responsibility of the law schools
to educate these potential leaders so that they will understand
fully the concomitant obligations that go with leadership. Failure
to do so is nothing less than irresponsible.
Here one meets again the question of the applicability of the
case method to education in this broader field. One has but to recall
Professor Countryman's categories to raise this question. While
court decisions are available relating to the lawyer's duty toward
courts and adequate representation of the needy, it is not an easy
task to locate decisions concerning a lawyer's appearance as a
26 MacLeish, Freedom is the Right to Choose, Foreword at viii (1943).
27 justice Stanley Reed stated many years ago, "Democracy has a right to expect
that the members of its Bar, as such, shall show their appreciation of the benefits
conferred upon them by a conscious effort to make that democracy effective." "The
Bar's Part in the Maintenance of American Democratic Ideals," 24 A.B.A.J. 622
(1938). Moreover, the present writer has asserted this persistently for many years:
supra note 25; "Professional Education and the American Tradition," in Selected
Readings on the Legal Profession 497 (1962) ; "Legal Ethics and Responsible
Leadership," id. at 493; Stone, op. cit. supra note 7, at 263, 403. See generally,
A.A.L.S., Selected Readings on the Legal Profession 407-22 (Boyer, Harno,
Mathews & Bradway ed. 1962); Harno, Legal Education in the United States
196 (1953). Said Henry L. Stimson, "I came to feel that the American lawyer should
regard himself as a potential officer of his government and a defender of its laws
and constitution .... I came to realize the importance played in a democracy by
persuasion as distinguished from force or threats and to recognize the importance
of the lawyer as a trained advocate of persuasion." Stimson & Bandy, On Active
Service in Peace and War, Introduction at xxii (1948).
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witness or lobbyist before a legislative body, his participation in law
reform, defense of the judicial system, public leadership, and the
organization and proper functioning of the bar. It would be even
more difficult to bring out by judicial materials the lawyer's re-
sponsibility to take time from a busy practice to enter into public
and controversial discussion of such diverse issues as fair housing
and racism, limitation on Congressional power to tax, strengthening
of the United Nations and of UNESCO, the anti-poverty program
and the dangers of right wing extremism or of military domination
of questions of foreign policy. Nor would it be difficult to name at
least as many more. True, textual excerpts can be inserted to cover
these responsibilities, but as teaching vehicles these are grossly
inadequate for stimulation of student interest and the provocation
of discussion. Yet each of the named areas is admirably suited for
development by means of problems. Indeed, each provides a further
persuasive argument for the problem approach.
One final comment should be made here. It concerns the ques-
tion of indoctrination. It has long seemed strange indeed that this
has so little concerned writers in this field.2 True, where training
in skills and techniques is concerned, the question is unlikely to be
critical, but where it is values that are to be communicated or clari-
fied, attitudes to be stimulated, the problem is very real indeed.
Here we reach the point where a commitment must be boldly
made, bravely hazarded. Indoctrination as here used, contains the
factor of compulsion as contrasted with considered choice and
conscious acceptance. The office of teacher implies authority; his
spoken word carries a weight disproportionate to its merit. Too
often his value judgments are accepted unthinkingly on his own
ipse dixit. In gross terms he may even imply the obligation or wis-
dom of unquestioning acceptance. In subtler terms he may indicate
such an expectation by discouragement of questions, discussion and,
most likely, contradiction. But wherein lies the danger? It lies in
the very contrast that in recent years we have come to see on a
much broader scale-the contrast between totalitarianism and the
free society we call democracy. It is the contrast between obedience
and choice, between automatic unthinking absorption, as in the
case of the sleeping Gamma babies in Aldous Huxley's Brave New
World, and considered balancing of desiderata followed by a con-
scious acceptance of that alternative which on balance evidences
the greater merit.
The merits of considered acceptance can be well illustrated
from another area-that of our national labor relations policy. There
28 An exception is the discussion at the Boulder Conference. See Chapter VI,
The Problem of Indoctrination, of Stone, op. cit. supra note 7, at 185-203.
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we have adhered to the fundamental principle that consensually
arrived at solutions are preferable to those imposed by the state.
We continue to adhere to this today, despite our realization that
there are times when the public interest suffers, times when a fiat
from on high would declare a wiser solution.
What is at stake here is basic indeed; in part it is a recogni-
tion of the dignity of personality and the desirability that persons
participate in the disposition of their own future. In part it is
pragmatic, in that experience has long shown that agreed-to solu-
tions are more faithfully and longer adhered to than those that
rest upon authority and power.
And so it is concerning the acceptance of values and the build-
ing of consequent attitudes. Students must be free to reject even
those values which their teachers sincerely espouse, and the proba-
bilities that those who reject will be few indeed has nothing at all
to do with the matter. The question can't be reduced to terms of
minimal risk. Rather, it is a matter that stands surely and firmly
on fundamental principle.
I suggest that there may well be general acceptance of the
proposition that the professedly rejected lecture method carries
vastly more of authority and compulsion than the case-method.
Perhaps on a more abstract level it can be correctly asserted that
the deductive method of teaching, as contrasted with the inductive,
carries a similar weight. One is on less clear ground, yet I take it
nevertheless, in asserting that the case method itself, inductive
though it is, lends itself more to authoritative implications than do
factual problems, even when such problems are accompanied by
references to cases deemed relevant aids to the formation of student
opinion. More specifically, problems relating to the choices by
lawyers among the varieties of conduct open to them can be dis-
cussed in the class-room with less recourse to the persuasiveness and
sanction of authority-in other words, with less element of compul-
sion-than can decisions that have already been made, be they by
courts or by bar association committees.
But even one who abhors indoctrination must frankly concede
that some small measure of it is unavoidable. Perhaps it is here
that the character and conduct of the teacher plays its little part,
for, in the sense that it is not the product of considered choice,
unthinking emulation is an unwitting form of indoctrination. Yet
one finds himself in a most insecure and vulnerable position if he
objects to such beneficial effects. On the other hand a healthy ques-
tioning of what the immediate values are that are relevant to a
solution of perplexing personal conduct, what respective weight
should be given them in the light of other long run values, whether
[Vol. 26
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both sets of values carry an appeal to the student as worthy of his
consideration, can go so far to force a re-examination of means and
ends as to expand substantially his capacity for critical judgment,
free choice and knowing acceptance.
In sum, the communication of a perception of values and their
clarification, acceptance and espousal in actual conduct, can be
more effectively accomplished by the study of problems, accom-
panied by references to relevant source material, than by an array
of decisions no matter how carefully and wisely selected. This gen-
eralization is supported, I believe, by the greater appeal to student
interest, by the vastly greater terrain, especially in the area now
known as public responsibility, in which problems may be used,
and finally in their susceptability to class-room discussion, under
wise teachers, in comparative freedom from the element of com-
pulsion which is, I assert, anathema to good teaching, personal
dignity and lasting acceptance.
